THE FATE OF MOROCCO.

AT last the fate of Morocco is sealed. After eighty years of jealous watchfulness of one another-ever since France laid her hand upon Algeria-the two Powers for whom alone of those who hankered after it this Naboth's vineyard lay within the field of practical politics have come to an understanding. In other words, in consideration of concessions elsewhere, the adequacy or otherwise of which is not here subject to discussion, England has agreed to allow France a free hand in Morocco. The questions which present themselves at once to the student of Moorish affairs are: (1) What use will France make of her opportunity; with what result, and for what loss or profit? (2) How will the welfare of the Moors be affected thereby? (3) What will it mean to other European nations interested? and (4) Has the compact, when viewed from a purely insular standpoint, been a wise step on behalf of England, or not?

Most of those who criticise the measure, favourably or unfavourably, having a preconceived idea of some sort as to the answer to the first, will deal exclusively with the last. This is apt, however, to mislead, for it is only after careful consideration of the previous questions, that this can be adequately dealt with. How then does France stand? The words of the agreement of April 8 are:

ART. II.-"The British Government recognises that it appertains to France, more especially as being the Power in contiguity with Morocco, to control the peace of that country, and to lend its assistance in all administrative, economical, financial, and military reforms. The British Government declares that it will not interfere with the action of France in this regard, provided that this action will leave intact the rights which, in virtue of treaties, conventions, and usages, Great Britain enjoys in Morocco, including the right of coasting between the Morocco ports, of which English vessels have had the benefit since 1901.

ART. VII. "In order to secure the free passage of the Straits of Gibraltar, both Governments agree not to allow fortifications or any strategic works to be erected on that part of the Moorish coast between Melilla and the heights which dominate the right bank of the Sebu exclusively.

ART. VIII. [Regarding the interests of Spain in this district] "the French Government will make some arrangements with the Spanish Government,. [which] will be communicated to the Government of His Britannic Majesty."

France here ge's all that she wants, or rather that the aggressive

Colonial party wants, for opinions are by no means united there, and the agreement at once called forth the condemnation of the more moderate party. What appears to be permissive means much more. Now that Great Britain has drawn back-the Power to which the late Sir John Drummond Hay taught the Moors to look with an implicit confidence to champion them against all foes, as it did in the case of the wars with France and Spain, vetoing the retention of a foot of Moorish soil-Morocco lies at the feet of France. France, indeed, becomes responsible for carrying out a task its eager spirits have been boiling over for a chance of undertaking. Morocco is made the ward of the hand that has been been gripping it, which has but recently filched two outlying members.

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Few are aware of the intrigues long carried on in Morocco by France; of the determined and successful efforts to become acquainted with its remotest provinces, the distribution of its population, and whatever could be of use to an invading or pacifying" force. What was impossible to the specially selected officers of the "Military Mission" while accompanying the Sultans to parts which Europeans had never hitherto penetrated, has been accomplished by sharp Algerians, educated far beyond the natives of Morocco. The most valuable portion of this knowledge remains pigeon-holed, or circulates only in strictly official mémoires, many of the officials engaged having amused themselves and the public by publishing pretty books of the average class, telling little new, while one even took the trouble to write his in English, in order to put us off the scent! If ever means could justify an end, France deserves to enjoy the fruit of her labours.

Now that she is free to act, what will she do? No longer need she foment strife on the Algerian frontier, or wink at arms being smuggled across it; no longer need the mis-named "pretender" be supplied with French gold, or intrigues be carried on at Court. Abd el Aziz must take the advice and "assistance" of France whether he will or no, and curse the British to whom he bas hitherto looked. France would neglect a serious duty if she did not at once instruct him how to set his realm in order. This must not, of course, involve such drastic changes as would rouse the people to rebellion, and precipitate a costly conquest. There are many reforms urgently required in the interests of the people themselves, and these can now be gradually enforced. Such reforms have been set on foot already by the young Sultan, mainly under British advice; but to his chagrin his advisers have not rendered the financial and moral support he needs to carry them out. France is now free to do this, and to strengthen his position, so that all wise reforms may be possible. These will naturally commence with civil and judicial functions, but must soon embrace the more pressing public works, such as roads, bridges, and port improve

ments. Railways are likely to be the first roads in most parts, and Mulai Abd el Aziz will welcome their introduction. The western ideas which he has imbibed during the last few years are scoffed at only by those who know little of him. What France will have to be prepared for is Court intrigue, and she will have to give the Moors plainly to understand that "Whatsoever king shall reign, she'll still be boss of the show,' sir."

The costly lesson of Algeria, where native rights and interests were overthrown, and a complete detested foreign rule set up, bas taught the French the folly of such a system, however glorious it may appear on paper. They have been wiser in Tunis, where a nominally native government is directed by Frenchmen, whom it pays, and where the only complaint of the natives is the intricacy of the law with its foreign procedure. Sooner or later Morocco is almost certain to become a second Tunisia. This will not only prove the best working system, but it will enable opposition to be dealt with by Moorish forces, instead of by an invading army which would unite the Berber tribes under the Moorish flag. This was what prolonged the conquest of Algeria for so many years, but the Berbers of Morocco are more independent still, and better armed than were those of Algeria seventy years ago.

It is fairly evident, therefore, what use France will make of her opportunity. The result cannot fail to be beneficial to all but those who batten on existing rottenness. What France will gain by it, beyond openings for Frenchmen, and the glory of an extended colonial empire, it is bard to imagine, but that seems to satisfy most countries greedy of conquest.

How the welfare of the Moors will be affected by the change is a much more important question, though one often held quite unworthy of consideration, the accepted axiom being that whether they like it or not, what is good for us is good for them. Needless to say that most of the reforms required will be objected to, and that serious opposition may be expected to some: the mere fact that the foreigner, presumed to be a Nazarene, is their author, is sufficient to prejudice them in native eyes, and the more prominent the part played by him the more difficult to follow his advice. But if the Sultan and his new advisers will consent to a wise course of quiet co-operation, much may be effected without causing trouble. It is astonishing how quietly the Moors submit to the most radical changes when unostentatiously but forcibly carried out. Never was a greater call for the suaviter in modo, fortiter in re. Power which makes itself felt by unwavering action has always had their respect, and if the Sultan is prepared not to act till with gold in his coffers, disciplined troops at command, and loyal officials to do his behest, he can do so with unquestioned finality, all will go well. Then will the prosperity of the people revive-indeed, achieve a

condition hitherto unknown save in two or three reigns of the distant past, perhaps not then. The poor will not fear to sow their barren fields, the rich to display their wealth; hidden treasure will come to light, and the groan of the oppressed will cease. Individual cases of gross injustice will doubtless arise; but they will be as nothing compared with what occurs in Morccco to-day, even with that wrought by Europeans who avail themselves of existing evils. So that if France is wise, and restrains her hot-heads, she may perform a magnificent work for the Moors, as the British have done in Egypt. The position there is more closely analogous, or likely to become so, than in Tunis, and it is to be earnestly hoped that she may do as well in Morocco.

The only difficulties likely to hamper her are such as she has hitherto created for us in Egypt, but England will not create them. Spain might try, and Spanish national feeling with regard to Morocco will have to be considerably modified before the people will resign themselves to the sight of France installed where their dreams have always carried their own flag. It is more than probable, however, that the wiser heads entrusted with her foreign affairs will bow to the inevitable, for Spain is certainly no more prepared to undertake the regeneration of Morocco than is Great Britain, though for very different reasons. Spain, however, is the only foreign Power having foothold in Morocco, and so bound up are some of her possessions there with her history, that though practically useless, she would give her life-blood to retain them.

There is Ceuta, which she withheld from the Portuguese after the brief union of the two crowns in the sixteenth century; there is Velez, an absolutely worthless rock, captured in 1564 by Garcia de Toledo with fifteen thousand men, the abandonment of which has more than once been seriously urged in Spain; there is Alhucemas, a small island occupied in 1673; there is Melilla, a huge rock peninsula captured, on his own account, by Medina Sidonia in 1497; and there are the Zaffarine (or Saffron) Islands, one only of which is used, in the seizure of which the French were cleverly forestalled in 1848. All are convict stations: unless heavily fortified in a manner that at present they are not, they would not be of sufficient value to tempt even a foe of Spain. Ceuta and Melilla alone are worthy of consideration, and the former is the only one it might ever pay to fortify. Yet these "presidios" are much thought of in Spain, as the new Agreement wisely recognises :

ART. VII. "This arrangement does not apply to the points now occupied by Spain on the Moorish shore of the Mediterranean.

ART. VIII. "The two Governments, animated by their sincerely friendly sentiments for Spain, take into particular consideration the interests she possesses, owing to her geographical position, and to her territorial possessions on the Moorish shore of the Mediterranean, in regard to which

the French Government will make some arrangement with the Spanish Government."

The preliminaries of this Agreement had been for some time afoot, and as far back as November 11 the protocol had been signed by M. Delcassé and the Spanish Ambassador in Paris, the Marques del Rio Muni. Into the preceding correspondence Germany and Italy had also entered, the former desirous of securing a "coaling station." Definite announcement of the terms finally arranged will be awaited with interest; but it is hardly conceivable that Spain will follow the example of Great Britain without a local quid pro quo, though possibly France may oblige Spain in some other direction. France will probably have not only to guarantee her peaceful possession of the "presidios," but also to promise-perhaps by a secret treaty, in order not to upset the Mocrs-to afford those posts unrestrained communication with the mainland, or even to allot to each a strip of mainland on condition that it should not be fortified, thus imparting to them at least commercial value. Spain will do well to take what she can by bargain, as she can never hope to get or hold it in war.

So far the Powers immediately concerned. Beyond them, Portugal, Italy and Austria have but to acquiesce and rest assured of the "most-favoured-nation" treatment, as will all the other Powers save one. That one, of course, is Germany, whose sole interest in Morocco is the possibility of placing a drag on France. She will have to be dealt with. Having disposed of England, which had real interests at stake, in the command of the Straits and the maintenance of Gibraltar, France should be able to accomplish this as well. Five and twenty years ago Germany had not even a commercial interest in Morocco. Great Britain did three-fourths of the trade, or more, France about a tenth, Spain and others dividing the crumbs between them. But an active commercial policy, by the encouragement and support of young firms in a way that has made Britishers envious and abusive of their own Foreign Office, has secured for Germany a growing share of the trade, till now she stands next to Great Britain, whose share is reduced to one-half.

There remains but our insular standpoint from which to consider the matter. To some, of limited horizon, the question as to whether we have made a good bargain centres round the possibility of our having stepped in to do what we have agreed to leave to France. Bat even to have allowed ourselves to be driven to undertake this task, as we were in Egypt, would have been a calamity, for our hands are too full already of similar tasks. It is all very well in these times of peace, but in the case of war, when we were the attacked, possibly by more than one antagonist, we should have all our work cut out to hold what we have. The policy of "grab," and dabbing the globe with red may be satisfactory up to