rules and precedents of international law, acted with absolute propriety. Suppose the Trent with Mason and Slidell on board, had sailed into New York harbor, would the right of their seizure have been questioned by any power on earth? And yet-and this is the point of this whole relation-their action proved so unacceptable to their government that the one was recalled and the other removed from his command with a reprimand. The secretary of the navy wrote to him: "It was your plain duty to proceed at once to meet the steamer before she cast anchor in the port, to warn the captain of the danger and to offer to his passenger, should he desire it, an asylum on board your ship." Having learned the facts, "it is impossible to suppose that you would have failed to offer the fugitive an asylum. Such an act could have violated no rights of the territorial government, for no rights over the person of the passenger could have yet vested : while it would have maintained the implied promise of protection which the United States makes to all who in good faith embark under its flag. By remaining inactive you neglected your obvious duties, and placed your government in the position of renouncing those who had sheltered themselves under its flag." Here, as in the Behring Sea affair, we notice a marked extension of the jurisdiction claimed by the United States. It announces to its naval officers the duty of protecting all political refugees sailing under its merchant flag, even when within the waters of the country to which those refugees belong, by strategy if not by force-the duty of bringing asylum to them, instead of permitting them to seek it. This was destined to bear fruit. THE ITATA CASE. In Chile in 1890 and early in 1891, Balmaceda, by his arbitrary and unconstitutional conduct, had driven a portion of the country into rebellion, but the Congressionalists had no ammunition. Arms and gunpowder they therefore must buy. This the Itata, a merchant steamer, tried to do at the Californian port of San Diego. She was hospitably received at San Diego, spent some time there quietly, then coaled and was about to put to sea. At this point it was reported that a smaller boat, presumably loaded with materials of war destined for the Itata, was waiting for her off an island out at sea. The Itata was accordingly seized on the charge of attempted breach of the neutrality laws, and a deputy United States marshal put in charge. Unwilling to be thus balked of his object her captain put to sea without his clearance papers and with the deputy on board. The latter was landed at the entrance of the bay. The Itata met her tender, shipped its cargo, and sailed for Chile. Thereupon began that sensational chase by the new cruiser Charleston, which ended, not in the capture intended, but in the surrender of the Itata by the Congressional leaders after she had eluded her pursuer. When we apply the recognized law to this seizure, chase, and surrender, we are struck by the unusual zeal of our government. Hitherto it has been considered lawful for our merchants to sell arms to all the world at peace or at war. Fitting out an armed expedition is illegal, but this was in no sense such. It was a purely commercial transaction. Balmaceda had his rights of capture of these contraband articles, but it has never before been the policy of this government to assist others in enforcing their war rights of capture for breach of blockade or for carrying contraband. It is true that the fact of transhipment of arms outside the three-mile limit does not alter the nature of the transaction, but the transaction was not a guilty one and there was no reason for such concealment. In leaving without clearance and in carrying off a deputy marshal (said by the way to be merely a private detective and not an officer of the government), the Itata may have technically violated our revenue laws, but that was the worst with which she could be charged, and that was the result of an improper seizure. And how must one characterize the chase of the Itata over thousands of miles of open sea? Pursuit hot and continuous by a revenue cutter for breach of revenue laws, has been known, extending to the high seas. But the Charleston started from San Francisco, five hundred miles away, and scoured the ocean for its prey with the intention of capturing her even if it led to a collision with a Congressional cruiser in Mexican waters. Such a pursuit, with such an object, appears to be absolutely novel. A state at peace has no jurisdiction over the ships of other nationalities on the high seas except on suspicion of piracy. Such a stretch of jurisdiction on the part of the most powerful state on this continent must necessarily appear an alarming ⚫ matter to all its neighbors. The Itata was brought back to San Diego, lay there awaiting trial for several months and then the case against her was dismissed as well as that against the tender Robert and Minnie. They had committed no breach of our laws in the judgment of our courts. This Itata matter naturally created a sentiment among the Congressionalists hostile to this country. Her surrender, dictated by the desire of that party to stand well with the government at Washington, and by their lack of a political status, left a sore spot which their sudden success did not lessen. Obtaining ammunition from a European source the Congressionalists at last were enabled to take the field and Balmaceda and his party chiefs were defeated. In view of the wish of the United States to advance its political and commercial influence in Chile this failure of our minister resident and of our admiral to "pick the winner" was most unlucky. The poor Balmacedists fled, fearing the vengeance which their cruelties had provoked and some naturally sought asylum at the United States embassy. At the cost of much discomfort this was accorded by Mr. Eagan, as it had been accorded to the Congressional fugitives when Balmaceda was supreme. Now this right of asylum in the South American republics is one that is governed by a usage rather different from that in vogue on the European continent. The legations are permitted to shelter political fugitives almost universally, and Chile in this instance did not attempt to question Mr. Eagan's privilege. the same time the correspondence of our various secretaries of state shows that though recognizing this difference of usage they do so with reluctance, believe it should be construed strictly, and deem it inconsistent with true equality of states. Thus, in the printed personal instructions to diplomatic agents, 1885, we find that "this government does not sanction the usage and enjoins upon its representatives in such countries the avoidance of all pretexts for its exercise." Mr. Frelinghuysen to Mr. Langston, in Haiti, 1883, uses the same words. Mr. Fish to Mr. Preston, in Haiti, 1875, argues at some length against the frequent recourse to asylum in the legation "especially in the governments to the south of us," since "such a practice obviously tends to the encouragement of offenses for which asylum may be desired." Mr. Fish to Mr. Cushing in Spain, 1875, characterizes the practice as an annoyance and embarrassment to the ministers whose legations are thus used and to their governments, and as a wrong to the government and people where it is practiced; to be mischievous in its tendencies and to tend to political disorder. Mr. Seward in 1868, expresses himself thus: "The right of a foreign legation to afford an asylum to political refugees is not recognized by the law of nations as applicable to civilized or constitutionally organized states." The chronic revolutionary condition of many of the South American nations has caused the usage to be recognized. "We have, however, constantly employed our influence for several years to meliorate and improve the political situation in these republics, with an earnest desire to relinquish the right of asylum there. In the year 1867 we formally renounced that right in the republic of Peru." Mr. Webster in 1851, to Mr. Peyton, in Chile, writes: "Acquiescence by the government of Chile on former occasions in the exercise of the hospitality of asylum in its larger sense may preclude that government from objecting to the continued granting such hospitality to the same extent. At the same time, if that government makes objection to the granting of that hospitality to a particular political refugee the minister of the United States, in whose house such refugee is sheltered, should advise him that this shelter can no longer be afforded." Mr. Clayton to Mr. McCauley, 1849, states that "though the privileges of asylum in South America are more liberally dispensed than in the leading European states they should be in all cases carefully guarded." Mr. Calhoun in 1844, is the only secretary of state to take the opposite tone: "The right of diplomatic asylum in revolutionary times and in revolutionary countries should be indulgently construed." Taking this almost uniform policy as our test we find that the asylum extended the Balmacedists by Mr. Eagan, acting under instructions from Washington, was excessive, in that it was granted to so large a number, in that its duration was unlimited, and particularly in that a safe conduct out of the country was insisted upon and finally obtained as a corollary to the right of asylum. While the controversy over this matter was in progress many seamen of the United States steamer Baltimore, on shoreleave in Valparaiso, were assaulted by what looked like an organized mob and two were killed. This deplorable affair caused great excitement and something like a war spirit was aroused in this country. Arrests were made of persons suspected of the violence, and the Chilian government, hardly established yet, expressed its regret though not very feelingly. The slow criminal process in Valparaiso dragged along and several of the suspects finally received light sentences. Meanwhile the Baltimore returned to San Francisco, where an examination of witnesses of this affray was conducted by the judge advocate of the navy. This of course was ex parte, the Chilian government having no counsel present. According to the evidence there adduced the riot was probably caused by race feeling, but the first blow was struck by an American seaman, and the men had visited several saloons though "perfectly sober." Our seamen ashore in Valparaiso are not under the jurisdiction of the United States. Chilian law and procedure alone are applicable to them. It is only when we have reason to believe that gross injustice has been done that we have a claim to review their findings. In the New Orleans lynching we insisted that the Italian government should await the action and decision of our courts. Why did we not owe the same respect to the Chilian judge? And was not the unwillingness of the Executive to show this, its appeal from Chilian jurisdiction, in taking fresh ex parte evidence and basing action upon it, an attempt to escape from the consequences and rights of that jurisdiction and to set up our own in place of it, |