"dead? No, but in great danger." How are you concerned in those rumours? Suppose he should meet some fatal stroke: you would foon raise up another Philip, if your interests are thus regarded. For it is not to his own ftrength that he so much owes his elevation, as to our fupineness. And should fome accident affect him; should fortune, who hath ever been more careful of the ftate than we ourselves, now repeat her favours (and may she thus crown them!) be affured of this, that by being on the spot, ready to take advantage of the confufion, you will every where be abfolute maflers; but in your present difpofition, even if a favourable juncture should present you with Amphipolis, you could not take poffeffion of it, while this suspence prevails in your defigns and in your councils.

And now, as to the necessity of a general vigour and alacrity; of this you must be fully perfuaded: this point therefore I shall urge no further. But the nature of the armament, which, I think, will extricate you from the present difficulties, the numbers to be raised, the fubfidies required for their fupport, and all the other neceflaries; how they may (in my opinion) be best and most expeditiously provided; these things 1 shall endeavour to explain. But here I make this request, Athenians! that you would not be precipitate, but suspend your judgment till you have heard me fully. And if, at first, I feem to propose a new kind of armament, let it not be thought that I am delaying your affairs. For it is not they whocryout, "Instantly!" "This moment!" whose counsels suit the present juncture (as it is not possible to repel violences already committed by any occafional detachment) but he who will shew you of what kind that armament must be, how great, and how supported, which may fubfift until we yield to peace, or till our enemies fink beneath our arms; for thus only can we be fecured from future dangers. These things, I think, I can point out; not that I would prevent any other perfon from declaring his opinion: thus far am I engaged. How I can acquit myfelf, will immediately appear to your judgments I appeal.

Firit then, Athenians! I say that you should fit out fifty ships of war; and then refolve, that on the first emergency you will embark yourselves. To these I insist that you muti add transport, and other necefiary vessels fufficient for half our horse.

These then are the resolutions I propose; these the provifions it will become you to make. And I pronounce it still farther necessary to raise some other forces which may harrass him with perpetual incursions. Talk not of your ten thousands, or twenty thousands of foreigners; of those armies which appear so magnificent on paper; but let them be the natural forces of the state: and if you chuse a single perfon, if a number, if this particular man, or whomever you appoint as general, let them be entirely under his guidance and authority. I also move you that fubfistence be provided for them. But as to the quality, the numbers, the maintenance of this body : how are these points to be settled ? I now proceed to speak of each of them diftinctly. The body of infantry therefore-But here give me leave to warn you of an error which hath often proved injurious to you. Think not that your preparations never can be too magnificent: great and terrible in your decrees; in execution weak and contemptible. Let your preparations, let your supplies at first be moderate, and add to these if you find them not fufficient. I say then that the whole body of infantry should be two thousand; of these, that five hundred should be Athenians, of fuch an age as you shall think proper; per; and with a stated time for service, not long, but fuch as that others may have their turn of duty. Let the rest be formed of foreigners. To these you are to add two hundred horfe, fifty of them at least Athenians, to serve

ing of the Etefians, and the severity of the winter, and forms his fieges when it is impossible for us to bring up our forces. It is your part then to confider this, and not to carry on the war by occafional detachments, (they will ever arrive too late) but by a regular army constantly kept up. And for winter-quarters you may command Lemnos, and Thassus, and Sciathus, and the adjacent iflands; in which there are ports and provisions, and all things neceffary for the foldiery in abundance. As to the season of the year, in which we may land our forces with the greatest ease, and be in no danger from the winds, either upon the coast to which we are bound, or at the entrance of those harbours where we may put in for provisions-this will be eafily discovered. In what manner, and at what time our forces are to act, their general will determine, according to the junctures of affairs. What you are to perform, on your part, is contained in the decree I have now proposed. And if you will be perfuaded, Athenians! first, to raise these fupplies which I have recommended, then to proceed to your other preparations, your infantry, navy, and cavalry; and, laftly, to confine your forces, by a law, to that fervice which is appointed to them; referving the care and diftribution of their money to yourselves, and strictly examining into the conduct of the general; then, your time will be no longer wasted in continual debates upon the same subject, and scarcely to any purpose; then, you will deprive him of the most confiderable of his revenues. For his arms are now supported, by feizing and making prizes of those who pass the feas. But is this all? - No. - You shall also be fecure from his attempts: not as when some time since he fell on Lemnos and Imbrus, and carried away your citizens in chains: not as when he furprized your vessels at Geraftus, and spoiled them of an unspeakable quantity of riches: not as when lately he made a defcent on the coast of Marathon, and carried off our facred galley: while you could neither oppose these insults, nor detach your forces at such junctures as were thought convenient.

And now, Athenians! what is the reason (think ye) that the public festivals in honour of Minerva and of Bacchus are always celebrated at the appointed time, whether the direction of them falls to the lot of men of eminence, or of persons less distinguished: (festivals which cost more trea

sure than is usually expended upon a whole navy; and more numbers and greater preparations, than any one perhaps ever coft) while your expeditions have been all too late, as that to Methone, that to Pegafæ, that to Potidea. The reason is this: every thing relating to the former is ascertained by law; and every one of you knows long before, who is to conduct the several entertainments in each tribe; what he is to receive, when, and from whom, and what to perform Not one of these things is left uncertain, not one undetermined. But in affairs of war, and warlike preparations, there is no order, no certainty, no regulation. So that, when any accident alarms us, first, we appoint our trierarchs; then we a low them the exchange; then the fupplies are confidered. These points once fettled, we resoive to man cur fleet with strangers and foreigners; then find it necessary to fupply their place ourselves. In the midst of these delays, what we are failing to defend, the enemy is already master of: for the time of action we spend in preparing: and the junctures of affairs will not wait our flow and irresolute meafures. These forces too, which we think may be depended on, until the new levies are raised, when put to the proof plainly difcover their infufficiency. By thefe means hath he arrived at such a pitch of infolence, as to fend a letter to the Eubeans, conceived in fuch terms as these :

****The LETTER is read.

What hath now been read, is for the most part true, Athenians! too true! but perhaps not very agreeable in the recital. But if, by tuppressing things ungrateful to the ear, the things themselves could be prevented, then the fole concern of a public speaker should be to please. If, on the contrary, these unteasonably pleasing speeches be really injurious, it is shameful, Athenians, to deceive yourselves, and, by deferring the confideration of every thing disagreeable, never once to move until it be too late; and not to apprehend that they who conduct a war with prudence, are not to follow, but to direct events; to direct them with the same absolute authority, with which a general leads on his forces that the course of affairs may be determined by them, and not determine their measures. But you, Athenians, although possessed of the greatest power of all kinds, ships, infantry, cavalry, and treasure;

treafure; yet, to this day, have never employed any of them seasonably, but are ever laft in the field. Just as barbarians engage at boxing, so you make war with Philip: for, when one of them receives a blow, that blow engages him: if struck in another part, to that part his hands are fhifted: but to ward off the blow, or to watch his antagonist-for this, he hath neither skill nor spirit. Even so, if you hear that Philip is in the Chersonefus, you refcive to fend forces thither; if in Ther mopyle, thither; if in any other place, you hurry up and down, you follow his standard. But no useful scheme for carrying on the war, no wise provifions are ever thought of, until you hear of some enterprise in execution, or already crowned wit a fuccess. This might have formerly been pardonable, but now is the very critical moment, when it can by no means be

admitted.

It seems to me, Athenians, that some divinity, who, from a regard to Athens, looks down upon our conduct with indignation, hath inspired Philip with this restless ambition. For were he to fit down in the quiet enjoyment of his conquests and acquifitions, without proceeding to any new attempts, there are men among you, who, I think, would be unmoved at those transactions, which have branded our state with the odious marks of infamy, cowardice, and all that is base. But as he ftill purfues his conquests, as he is still extending his ambitious views, possibly, he may at last call you forth, unless you have renounced the name of Athenians. To me

it is altonishing, that none of you look back to the beginning of this war, and confider that we engaged in it to chastise the infolence of Philip; but that now it is become a defenfive war, to secure us from his attempts. And that he will ever be repeating these attempts is manifest, unlefs fome power rises to oppose him. But, if we wait in expectation of this, if we fend out armaments composed of empty gallies, and those hopes with which fome tpeaker may have flattered you; can you then think your interests well secured? shall we not embark? shall we not fail, with at leaft a part of our domestic force, now, fince we have not hitherto ?-But where shall we make our defcent? - Let us but engage in the enterprise, and the war itself, Athenians, will thew us where he is weakest. But if we fit at home, listening to the mutual invectives and accusations of our ora

tors; we cannot expect, no, not the leaft success, in any one particular. Wherever a part of our city is detached, although the whole be not present, the favour of the gods and the kindness of fortune attend to fight upon our fide; but when we send out a general, and an infignificant decree, and the hopes of our speakers, misfortune and disappointment must ensue. Such expeditions are to our enemies a sport, but strike our allies with deadly apprehenfions. For it is not, it is not possible for any one man to perform every thing you desire. He may promife, and harangue, and accuse this or that perfon: but to such proceedings we owe the ruin of our affairs. For, when a general who commanded a wretched collection of unpaid foreigners, hath been defeated; when there are perfons here, who, in arraigning his conduct, dare to advance falsehoods, and when you lightly engage in any determination, just from their fuggestions; what must be the consequence ? How then shall these abuses be removed? -By offering yourselves, Athenians, to execute the commands of your general, to be witnesses of his conduct in the field, and his judges at your return: fo as not only to hear how your affairs are transacted, but to inspect them. But now, so shamefully are we degenerated, that each of our commanders is twice or thrice called before you to answer for his life, though not one of them dared to hazard that life, by once engaging his enemy. No, they chuse the death of robbers and pilferers, rather than to fall as becomes them. Such malefactors should die by the fentence of the law. Generals should meet their fate bravely in the field.

Then, as to your own conduct some wander about, crying, Philip hath joined with the Lacedemonians, and they are concerting the deftruction of Thebes, and the dissolution of fome free states. Others affure us he hath fent an embassy to the king; others, that he is fortifying places in Illyria. Thus we all go about framing our several tales. I do believe indeed, Athenians! he is intoxicated with his greatness, and does entertain his imagination with many fuch visionary prospects, as he fees no power rifing to oppose him, and is elated with his success. But I cannot be perfuaded that he hath so taken his measures, that the weakest among us know what he is next to do: (for it is the weakest among us who spread these rumours)-Let us disregard them: let us be perfuaded of

*

this, that he is our enemy, that he hath fpoiled us of our dominions, that we have long been subject to his insolence, that whatever we expected to be done for us by others, hath proved against us, that all the refource left is in ourselves, that, if we are not inclined to carry our arms abroad, we may be forced to engage here-let us be perfuaded of this, and then we shall come to a proper determination, then shall we be freed from those idle tales. For we are not to be folicitous to know what particular events will happen; we need but be convinced nothing good can happen, unless you grant the due attention to affairs, and be ready to act as becomes Athenians.

I, on my part, have never upon any occafion chosen to court your favour, by speaking any thing but what I was convinced would serve you. And, on this occafion, I have freely declared my sentiments, without art, and without reserve. It would have pleased me indeed, that, as it is for your advantage to have your true interest laid before you, fo I might be assured that he who layeth it before you, would share the advantages: for then I had spoken with greater alacrity. However, uncertain as is the consequence with respect to me, I yet determined to speak, because I was convinced that these measures, if pursued, must have their ufe. And, of all those opinions which are offered to your acceptance, may that be chofen, which will best advance the general weal! Leland.

§2. The first Olynthiac Oration: pronounced four Years after the first Philippic, in the Archonship of Callimachus, the fourth Year of the Hundred and Seventh Olympiad, and the twelfth of Philip's Reign.

INTRODUCTION.

The former Oration doth not appear to have had any confiderable effect. Philip had his creatures in the Athenian assembly, who probably recommended less vigorous measures, and were but too favourably heard. In the mean time, this prince pursued his ambitious designs. When he found himself shut out of Greece, he turned his arms to fuch remote parts, as he might reduce without alarming the states of Greece. And, at the fame time, he revenged himself upon the Athenians, by making, himself master of fome places which they laid claim to. At length his success emboldened him to declare those inten

tions which he had long entertained fecretly against the Olynthians. Olynthius (a city of Thrace possessed by Greeks originally from Chalcis, -a town of Eubea and colony of Athens) commanded a large tract called the Chalcidian region, in which there were thirty-two cities. It had arifen by degrees to such a pitch of grandeur, as to have frequent and remarkable contests both with Athens and Lacedemon. Nor did the Olynthians shew great regard to the friendship of Philip when he first came to the throne, and was taking all measures to fecure the possession of it. For they did not fcruple to receive two of his brothers by another marriage, who had fled to avoid the effects of his jealousy; and endeavoured to conclude an alliance with Athens, againft him, which he, by fecret practices, found means defeat. But as he was yet scarcely secure upon his throne, instead of expressing his resentment, he courted, or rather purchased, the alliance of the Olynthians, by the cession of Anthemus, a city which the kings of Macedon had long disputed with them, and afterwards, by that of Pydna and Potidea; which their joint forces had besieged and taken from the Athenians. But the Olynthians could not be influenced by gratitude towards such a benefactor. The rapid progress of his arms, and his glaring acts of perfidy, alarmed them exceedingly. He had already made fome inroads on their territories, and

to

now began to act against them with less reserve. They therefore difpatched ambassadors to Athens to propose an alliance, and request afsistance against a power which they were equally concerned to oppofe. Philip affected the highest resentment at this step; alledged their mutual engagements to adhere to each other in war and peace; inveighed against their harbouring his brothers, whom he called the conspirators; and, under pretence of punishing their infractions, purfued his hoftilities with double vigour, made himself master of fome of their cities, and threatened the capital with a fiege.

In the mean time, the Olynthians preffed the Athenians for immediate fuc