cours. Their ambassadors opened their commission in an affembly of the people, who had the right either to agree to, or to reject their demand. As the importance of the occafion increased the number of speakers, the elder orators had debated the affair before Demofthenes arose. In the following oration therefore he speaks as to a people already informed, urges the necessity of joining with the Olynthians, and confirms his opinion by powerful arguments; lays open the designs and practices of Philip, and labours to remove their dreadful apprehenfions of his power. He concludes with recommending to them to reform abuses, to restore ancient discipline, and to put an end to all domestic diffenfions.

IN many instances (Athenians!) have the gods, in my opinion, manifestly declared their favour to this state: nor is it leaft obfervable in this present juncture. For that an enemy should arise against Philip, on the very confines of his kingdom, of no inconfiderable power, and, what is of moft importance, so determined upon the war, that they confider any accommodation with him, first, as infidious, next, as the downfal of their country: this feems no less than the gracious interpofition of Heaven itself. It must, therefore, be our care (Athenians!) that we ourselves may not fruftrate this goodness. For it must reflect disgrace, nay, the fouleft infamy upon us, if we appear to have thrown away not those states and territories only which we once commanded, but those alliances and favourable incidents, which fortune hath provided for us. To begin on this occafion with a display of Philip's power, or to press you to exert your vigour, by motives drawn from hence, is, in my opinion, quite improper. And why? Because whatever may be offered upon such a subject, sets him in an honourable view, but seems to me, as a reproach to our conduct. For the higher his exploits have arisen above his former eftimation, the more must the world admire him: while your disgrace hath been the greater, the more your conduct hath proved unworthy of your state. These things therefore I shall pass over. He indeed, who examines justly, must find the fource of all his greatness here, not in himfelf. But the services he hath here re

ceived, from those whose public adminiftration hath been devoted to his interest; those services which you must punish, I do not think it seasonable to difplay. There are other points of more moment for you all to hear; and which muft excite the greatest abhorrence of him, in every reasonable mind.-Thefe I shall lay before you.

And now, should I call him perjured and perfidious, and not point out the inftances of this his guilt, it might be deemed the mere virulence of malice, and with justice. Nor will it engage too much of your attention to hear him fully and clearly convicted, from a full and clear detail of all his actions. And this I think useful upon two accounts: first, that he nay appear, as he really is, treacherous and falfe; and then, that they who are struck with terror, as if Philip was something more than human, may fee that he hath exhausted all those artifices to which he owes his present elevation; and that his affairs are now ready to decline. For I myself (Athenians!) should think Philip really to be dreaded and admired, if I saw him raised by honourable means. But I find, upon reflection, that at the time when certain persons drove out the Olynthians from this assembly, when defirous of conferring with you, he began with abusing our fimplicity by his promise of furrendering Amphipolis, and executing the secret article of his treaty, then so much fpoken of: that, after this, he courted the friendship of the Olynthians by seizing Potidæa, where we were rightful fovereigns, despoiling us his former allies, and giving them poffeffion: that, but just now, he gained the Theffalians, by promifing to give up Magnesia; and, for their ease, to take the whole conduct of the Phocian war upon himself. In a word, there are no people who ever made the least use of him, but have fuffered by his subtlety: his present greatness being wholly owing to his deceiving those who were unacquainted with him, and making them the inftruments of his success. As these states therefore raised him, while each imagined he was promoting some interest of theirs; these states must also reduce him to his former meanness, as it now appears that his own private interest was the end of all his actions.

Thus then, Athenians! is Philip circumstanced. If not, let the man stand forth, who can prove to me, I should have

faid to this assembly, that I have afferted these things falsely; or that they whom he hath deceived in former instances, will confide in him for the future; or that the Thessalians, who have been so baselv, so undeservedly enslaved, would not gladly embrace their freedom. If there be any one among you, who acknowledges all this, yet thinks that Philip will fupport his power, as he hath secured places of strength, convenient ports, and other like advantages; he is deceived. For when forces join in harmony and affection, and

one common interest unites the confederating powers, then they share the toils with alacrity, they endure the distresses, they perievere. But when extravagant ambition, and lawless power (as in his cafe) have aggrandised a single person; the first pretence, the flightest accident, overthrows him, and all his greatness is dashed at once to the ground. For it is not, no, Athenians! it is not poffible to found a lafting power upon injustice, perjury, and treachery. These may perhaps succeed for once; and borrow for a while, from hope, a gay and flourishing appearance. But time betrays their weakness; and they fall into ruin of themselves. For, as in structures of every kind, the lower parts should have the greatest firmness, so the grounds and principles of of actions should be just and true. But these advantages are not found in the actions of Philip.

I say then, that you should dispatch fuccours to the Olynthians: (and the more honourably and expeditiously this is proposed to be done, the more agreeably to my fentiments) and send an embassy to the Theffalians, to inform fome, and to enliven that fpirit already raised in others: (for it hath actually been refolved to demand the reftitution of Pagasæ, and to affert their claim to Magnesia.) And let it be your care, Athenians, that our ambaffadors may not depend only upon words, but give them some action to display, by taking the field in a manner worthy of the state, and engaging in the war with vigour. For words, if not accompanied by actions, must ever appear vain and contemptible; and particularly when they come from us, whose prompt abilities, and well-known eminence in speaking, make us to be always heard with the greater fufpicion.

Would you indeed regain attention and confidence, your measures must be greatly changed, your conduct totally reformed;

your fortunes, your persons, must appear devoted to the common cause; your ute most efforts must be exerted. If you will act thus, as your honour and your interest require; then, Athenians! you will not only discover the weakness and infincerity of the confederates of Philip, but the ruinous condition of his own kingdom will also be laid open. The power and fovereignty of Macedon may have some weight indeed, when joined with others. Thus, when you marched against the Olynthians, under the conduct of Timotheus, it proved an useful ally; when united with the Olynthians against Potidæa, it added something to their force; just now, when the Theffalians were in the midst of disorder, fedition, and confufion, it aided them against the family of their tyrants: (and in every cafe, any, even a small accession of strength, is, in my opinion, of confiderable effect.) But of itself, unsupported, it is infirm, it is totally distempered: for by all those glaring exploits, which have given him this apparent greatness, his wars, his expeditions, he hath rendered it yet weaker than it was naturally. For you are not to imagine that the inclinations of his fubjects are the fame with those of Philip. He thirsts for glory: this is his object, this he eagerly purfues, through toils and dangers of every kind; despising safety and life, when compared with the honour of atchieving such actions as no other prince of Macedon could ever boast of. But his subjects have no part in this ambition. Harrassed by those various excurfions he is ever making, they groan under perpetual calamity; torn from their bufiness, and their families, and without opportunity to dispose of that pittance which their toils have earned; as all commerce is shut out from the coast of Macedon by the

war.

Hence one may perceive how his fubjects in general are affected to Philip. But then his auxiliaries, and the foldiers of his phalanx, have the character of wonderful forces, trained compleatly to war. And yet I can affirm, upon the credit of a perfon from that country, incapable of falfehood, that they have no fuch superiority. For, as he affures me, if any man of experience in military affairs should be found among them, he dismisses all fuch, from an ambition of having every great action ascribed wholly to himself: (for, befides his other passions, the man hath this ambition in the highest degree.) And if any perfon, fon, from a sense of decency, or other virtaous principle, betrays a dislike of his daily intemperance, and riotings, and obfcenities, he toses all favour and regard; fo that none are left about him, but wretches, who fubfift on rapine and flattery, and who, when heated with wine, do not fcruple to descend to fuch instances of revelry, as it would shock you to repeat. Nor can the truth of this be doubted: for they whom we all conspired to drive from hence, as infamous and abandoned, Callias the public fervant, and others of the fame stamp; buffcons, compofers of lewd fongs, in which they ridicule their companions: these are the perfons whom he entertains and caresses. And thele taings, Athenians, trifling as they may appear to some, are to men of just difcernment great indications of the weakness both of his mind and fortune. At present, his fuccesses cast a shade over them; for profperity hath great power to veil fuch baseness from observation. But let his arms meet with the least disgrace, and all his actions will be exposed. This is a truth, of which he himself, Athenians! will, in my opinion, foon convince you, if the gods favour us, and you exert your vigour. For as in our bodies, while a man is in health, he feels no effect of any inward weakness; but, when disease attacks him, every thing becomes sensible, in the veffels, in the joints, or in whatever other part his frame may be disordered; so in ftates and monarchies, while they carry on a war abroad, their defects escape the ge neral eye: but when once it approaches their own territory, then they are all de

tected.

If there be any one among you who, from Philip's good fortune, concludes that he must prove a formidable enemy; such reasoning is not unworthy a man of prudence. Fortune hath great influence, nay, the whole influence, in all human affairs: but then, were I to chuse, I should prefer the fortune of Athens (if you yourselves will affert your own cause, with the least degree of vigour) to this man's fortune. For we have many better reasons to depend upon the favour of Heaven, than this man. But our present state is, in my opinion, a ftate of total inactivity; and he who will not exert his own strength, cannot apply for aid, either to his friends or to the gods. It is not then surprising, that he who is himself ever amidst the dangers and labours of the field; who is every

where; whom no opportunity escapes; to whom no season is unfavourable; should be fuperior to you, who are wholly en, gaged in contriving delays, and framing decrees, and enquiring after news. I am not surprised at this, for the contrary muft have been surprising: if we, who never act in any fingle instance, as becomes a state engaged in war, should conquer him, who, in every inltance, acts with an inde. fatigable vigilance. This indeed surprises me; that you, who fought the cause of Greece against Lacedemon, and generoufly declined all the many favourable opportunities of aggrandizing yourselves; who, to secure their property to others, parted with your own, by your contributions; and bravely exposed yourselves in battle; should now decline the service of the field, and delay the necessary supplies, when called to the defence of your own rights: that you, in whom Greece in general, and each particular state, hath often found protection, should fit down quiet spectators of your own private wrongs. This I fay surprises me: and one thing more; that not a man among you can reflect how long a time we have been at war with Philip, and in what measures, this time hath all been wafted. You are not to be informed, that, in delaying, in hoping that others would affert our cause, in accusing each other, in impeaching, then again entertaining hopes, in such measures as are now pur sued, that time hath been entirely wasted. And are you so devoid of apprehenfion, as to imagine, when our state hath been reduced from greatness to wretchedness, that the very fame conduct will raise us from wretchedness to greatness ? No! this is not reasonable, it is not natural; for it is much easier to defend, than to acquire dominions. But, now, the war hath left us nothing to defend: we must acquire. And to this work you yourselves alone are equal.

This, then, is my opinion. You should raise supplies; you should take the field with alacrity. Prosecutions should be all suspended until you have recovered your affairs; let each man's fentence be determined by his actions: honour those who have deserved applause; let the iniquitous meet their punishment: let there be no pretences, no deficiencies on your part; for you cannot bring the actions of others to a fevere scrutiny, unless you have first been careful of your own duty. What indeed can be the reason, think ye, that

every man whom ye have sent out at the head of an army, hath deferted your ser vice, and fought out fome private expedition? (if we must speak ingenuously of these our generals also,) the reason is this: when engaged in the service of the flate, the prize for which they fight is yours. Thus, should Amphipolis be now taken, you inftantly possess yourselves of it: the commanders have all the danger, the rewards they do not share. But, in their private enterprises, the dangers are lefs; the acquifitions are all shared by the generals and foldiers; as were Lampsacus, Sigæum, and those veslels which they plundered. Thus are they all determined by their private interest. And, when you turn your eyes to the wretched state of your affairs, you bring your generals to a trial; you grant them leave to speak; you hear the neceffities they plead; and then acquit them. Nothing then remains for us, but to be distracted with endless contefts and divisions: (some urging these, some zhose meafures) and to feel the public calamity. For in former times, Athenians, you divided into classes, to raise supplies. Now the business of these classes is to govern; each hath an orator at its head, and a general, who is his creature; the THREE HUNDRED are assistants to these, and the rest of you divide, some to this, some to that party. You must rectify these diforders: you must appear yourselves: you must leave the power of speaking, of advising, and of acting, open to every citizen. But if you fuffer some persons to ifiue out their mandates, as with a royal authority; if one set of men be forced to fit out ships, to raise supplies, to take up arms; while others are only to make decrees against them, without any charge, any employment befides; it is not poffible that any thing can be effected seasonably and fuccessfully: for the injured party ever will defert you; and then your fole resource will be to make them feel your resentment instead of your enemies.

To fum up all, my sentiments are these: -That every man should contribute in proportion to his fortune; that all should take the field in their turns, until all have served; that whoever appears in this place, should be allowed to speak: and that, when you give your voices, your true interest only should determine you, not the authority of this or the other speaker. Purfue this course, and then your applause will not be lavished on fome orator, the

4

INTRODUCΤΙΟΝ.

To remove the impression made on the minds of the Athenians by the preceding oration, Demades and other popular leaders in the interests of Philip rose up, and opposed the propositions of Demofthenes, with all their eloquence. Their oppofition, however, proved ineffectual: for the assembly decreed, that relief should be sent to the Olynthians: and thirty gallies and two thousand forces were accordingly dispatched, under the command of Chares. But these succours, confifting entirely of mercenaries, and commanded by a general of no great reputation, could not be of confiderable service: and were besides suspected, and scarcely less dreaded by the Olynthians than the Macedonians themselves. In the mean time, the progrefs of Philip's arms could meet with little interruption. He reduced several places in the region of Chalcis, razed the fortress of Zeira, and, having twice defeated the Olynthians in the field, at last shut them up in their city. In this emergency, they again applied to the Athenians, and pressed for fresh and effectual fuccours. In the following oration, Demofthenes endeavours to support this petition; and to prove that both the honour and the interest of the Athenians demanded their immediate compliance. As the expence of the armament was the great point of difficulty, he recommends the abrogation of such laws, as prevented the proper settlement of the funds necessary for carrying on a war of such importance. The nature of these laws will come immediately to be explained.

It appears, from the beginning of this oration, that other speakers had arisen before Demofthenes, and inveighed loudly against Philip. Full of the national prejudices, or disposed to flatter the Athenians in their notions of the dignity and importance of their ftate, state, they breathed nothing but indignation against the enemy, and poflibly, with some contempt of his present enterprises, proposed to the Athenians to correct his arrogance, by an invasion of his own kingdom. Demofthenes, on the contrary, insists on the neceffity of self-defence; endeavours to rouse his hearers from their security, by the terror of impending danger; and affects to confider the defence of Olynthus, as the laft and only means of preserving the very being of Athens.

I AM by no means affected in the fame manner, Athenians! when I review the state of our affairs, and when I attend to those speakers, who have now declared their sentiments. They infist, that we should punish Philip: but our affairs, fituated as they now appear, warn us to guard against the dangers with which we ourselves are threatened. Thus far therefore I must differ from these speakers, that I apprehend they have not proposed the proper object of your attention. There was a time indeed, I know it well, when the ftate could have possessed her own dominions in security, and sent out her armies to inflict chastisement on Philip. I myself haye seen that time when we enjoyed fuch power. But, now, I am perfuaded we should confine ourselves to the protection of our allies. When this is once effected, then we may confider the punishment his outrages have merited. But, till the first great point be well secured, it is weakness to debate about our more remote

concernments.

And now, Athenians, if ever we stood in need of mature deliberation and counfel, the present juncture calls loudly for them. To point out the course to be purfued on this emergency, I do not think the greatest difficulty: but I am in doubt in what manner to propose my sentiments; for all that I have observed, and all that I have heard, convinces me, that most of your misfortunes have proceeded from a want of inclination to pursue the necessary measures, not from ignorance of them. Let me intreat you, that, if I now speak with an unusual boldness, ye may bear it: confidering only, whether speak truth, and with a fincere intention to advance your future interests: for you now fee, that by fome orators, who study but

I

to gain your favour, our affairs have been reduced to the extremity of distress.

I think it necessary, in the first place, to recal fome late transactions to your thoughts. You may remember, Athenians, that, about three or four years since, you received advice that Philip was in Thrace, and had laid fiege to the fortress of Heræa. It was then the month of November. Great commotions and debates arose. It was refolved to send out forty gallies; that all citizens, under the age of five-and-forty, should themselves embark; and that fixty talents should be raised. Thus it was agreed; that year passed away; then came in the months July, August, September. In this last month, with great difficulty, when the mysteries had first been celebrated, you fent out Charidemus, with just ten vessels unmanned, and five talents of filver. For when reports came of the fickness, and the death of Philip, (both of these were affirmed) you laid aside your intended armament, imagining, that at such a juncture, there was no need of fuccours. And yet this was the very critical moment; for, had they been dispatched with the same alacrity with which they were granted, Philip would not have then escaped, to become that formidable enemy he now appears.

But what was then done, cannot be amended. Now we have the opportunity of another war: that war I mean, which hath induced me to bring these transfactions into view, that you may not once more fall into the fame errors. How then shall we improve this opportunity? This is the only question. For, if you are not resolved to afift with all the force you can command, you are really ferving under Philip, you are fighting on his fide. The Olynthians are a people, whose power was thought confiderable. Thus were the circumstances of affairs: Philip could not confide in them; they looked with equal fufpicion upon Philip. We and they then entered into mutual engagements of peace and alliance: this was a grievous embarrassment to Philip, that we should have a powerful state confederated with us, spies upon the incident of his fortune. It was agreed, that we should, by all means, engage this people in a war with him: and now, what we all so earnestly defired, is effected: the manner is of no moment. What then remains for us, Athenians, but to fend immediate and effectual fuccours,

Ss

I cannot