hortations as now when elections are proceeding? We are suffering the fleeting and felicitous hours to escape-the elections are nearly over. Not so folly-struck are we as to suppose any exhortations of ours could influence present returns, or we would have taken good care to be beforehand with them. No, such exhortations must be utterly useless, whilst almost every seat is shackled or fixed. We care not, for our own parts, if not another friend to the principle ever steps within the walls of Parliament, convinced as we are, that eventually the overruling and commanding voice of the UNREPRESENTED will make converts of them all; and seeing, as we have often seen, how suddenly such assemblies can change their tone. We are for urging this paramount question in season and out of season,' but we discuss it at this particular period, because the subject is in some measure forced upon us by the scene before us, and because men's minds are more indelibly impressible when facts are at the very moment corroborating our representations.

Except the higher and wealthier classes of society, and you find the nation in a state of deep dissatisfaction. Why, what is the matterwhat does it want? All the freedom compatible with social existence; all the equality consistent with the unchangeable variety of circumstance; all the rights, the exercise of which tends to produce the greatest sum of happiness. For these purposes it is that society exists, and the government that does not secure these purposes, ceases to accomplish the very thing for which it is instituted, and must be corrected. But the glorious constitution of England does secure these noble objects. Idle vapouring. Of what importance is the letter of the constitution, if the practice have nothing to do with it? Is it to be endured, that the constitution shall be built upon one principle, and the exercise of it proceed upon another? That the House of Commons be the representatives of the people-meaning by the people, we suppose, all but the king and his peers and freely chosen, is, we believe, one written article of the constitution. But is that House the representative of the universal people, and is it thus freely chosen? We know it is not. Then is this boasted right, after all, no article of the English constitution; and of course, with such a deficiency, it does not fulfil the purpose for which alone a constitution, one at least suited to an enlightened and intelligent people, is established. But still, it will be said, though our representatives have by degrees come indeed to be elected very unequally, yet no essential injustice is done some of all classes and all professions are in the House, and every member is a representative of the nation, and not of any particular spot. Is it meant by this, then, that the House of Commons really represents the sentiments of the nation fairly? How know we this? One half of the nation has not even the legal right of suffrage; how know we what are the sentiments of that excluded half? Of those again, who have the legal qualification, not one half can freely exercise it; how then know we what are their views and wishes? Not one fourth-the particular fraction is not at all material-not one fourth of the people, then, elect those who take upon them to legislate for the whole nation, and still you pretend the sense of the whole nation is correctly conveyed, and their interests carefully protected. It is a random guess, an idle assumption, an impudent assertion made by those who have power, to blind those who have none.

Where all have a common interest, as every member of a particular community must be allowed to have, and the numbers too great to assemble, representation is the natural dictate of common sense; but equally is it the dictate of that same common sense, that every member have the right of naming representatives. With a population of eighteen millions, and six hundred representatives, one will represent thirty thousand. He may represent more or less-more in country districts than in towns; the particular ratio is a matter of indifference. Fix what ratió you please, there will be no keeping to it with any continued accuracy. If, by the process of gradual changes, one man comes to represent forty thousand, and another only twenty thousand, no great harm is done; but when one man represents but a dozen or two, or only himself, or his patron, and another a hundred thousand, the gross inequality is in itself an evil, and involves more evils than can readily be calculated.

Still the old answer recurs, and really if it had any foundation in principle, we would treat it respectfully; the member is a representative of the nation, and not simply of those who return him. Then where is the responsibility? To whom is he to account? The whole nation cannot take cognizance. Those only who actually elect have the power, and consequently the right of doing so; and when these electors become few-why, of course, they may be bought, or be silenced. Responsibility is thus at an end, and with it representation also. But every place of any considerable extent has local interests, which the representative must and does undertake to attend to-nay to attend to these it is that he is, in numerous instances, especially appointed; and for neglecting which, he would deserve to be rejected on his return. But how, again, is he to judge of these local interests? By the sense of the majority-those who actually send him to parliament. No such thing. The majority of those whom these local interests affect have had no voice whatever in electing him-then how is he to estimate these interests, or how can he tell when he is really protecting them? He is strictly the representative of a privileged set of jobbers.

In point of fact, the existing state of the representation is not a system, but an accident-not the effect of any legal enactment, but the precarious result of by-gone circumstances. Originally the crown summoned delegates from what quarters it pleased-from places that were supposed best capable of contributing. The office was burdensome and irksome, and delegates were obliged to be salaried. The privilege was never solicited-nay, it was frequently deprecated, because the parties were summoned only to grant subsidies. By degrees the Commons gained strength, and with it the right to advise; then representation became a matter of importance - then those who had been usually summoned to perform a duty, claimed a right to attend, to exercise a privilege. But, in a long course of years, these places underwent great changes: some increased and some diminished; some spread into large commercial cities, and others dwindled into villages, the property of single individuals. Places, again, which had been before too insignificant to be thought of, grew up into extensive manufacturing towns; but as they, in their state of insignificance, had never been summoned by the crown, there was no pretence of custom for a claim of right-and thus were they left unrepresented. Those who were in possession of the right, now regarded as a privilege, resisted the pretensions of others; the unrepresented had no means of enforcing their wishes, and no man cared for their rights.

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Those who have had power, have, of course, always exercised it. The Lords had it, and enforced it under John. In their charter, wrested from him, they talk of all, as entitled to certain rights-that of not being taxed without their own consent being one of them. But whom did they mean by all? Themselves. And again, when the Commons remonstrated in the reign of Charles-and again, the Lords and Commons, on the appointment of William, of whom were they thinking, when they talked of equality of rights of all? No, no. language of universality has, however, always beguiled the credulous; and it is only by the slow process of growing intelligence the discovery is made, that a legislative all means only a part, and that exclusion from the elective franchise is, in fact, exclusion from all share in the government, and all possibility of protecting unrepresented interests. With the intelligence grows the power of the people, and now, at last, the times are fast approaching, when nothing short of equality of rights, strictly, literally, universally, will satisfy the demands of that intelligence.

This equality of rights consists mainly and pre-eminently in universal suffrage. All are members of the community; all have interests; the little is as valuable to the poor, as the much to the rich. In innumerable instances, all are comprehended within the enactments of the laws, and therefore all have a right to assist in constructing those laws. We put this right, not upon the payment of taxes, direct or indirect, because taxation may and ought to be so reduced, and might be so levied, as altogether to exempt the labouring classes; but though a state of perfect exemption from taxes be just and conceivable enough, exemption from the operation of the laws, in a multitude of cases, is not conceivable. No individual can completely escape; and every one desires at least their protection. Every man may be called upon to aid in the defence of his country, and therefore has a right to inquire into the necessity of that call. Every man may be tempted into some violation of the law, and therefore has an interest in establishing the equitability of that law. Every man is exposed to the chances of ruin and wretchedness-to a state of pauperism, and therefore is interested in securing a provision for such exigencies. We refer to no ancient law or obsolete customwhat does the reason of the thing require? Equality, beyond all equivocation; and therefore nothing short of universal suffrage will meet the demands of justice and common sense, will secure the possession of rights, and freedom from oppression-the object and purpose for which a people submit to social restrictions at all.

With this claim of universal suffrage, annual parliaments are so associated, that, of course, we insist upon their indispensableness. Not at all. We see no necessity for such frequent changes. Circumstances are no doubt continually fluctuating; but not so rapidly as to require annual revisions. The duration is a matter of conventionquite a subordinate consideration, and open to discussion. Parliaments of two or three years may be superior to annual ones, as we think they would be; and as they certainly would be to septennial ones. We care not about rights depending upon precedent or prescription-what is most conducive to the purposes for which parliament assemble, that is best. To insist upon annual parliaments, on the ground that our ancestors once possessed them, is really nonsense. Whether they had them or not-what is it to us? The important question is, do we want

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them? If so, we claim them, not as the recovery of a privilege, but as a right, calculated for the general advantage of society, and the maintenance of its security. Time and temper have been lost in these idle squabbles, and the cause encumbered and degraded by them.

But this extension of the elective right will involve a prodigious change, and infringe upon long-enjoyed privileges. What then? Have you only to usurp, to establish a right? Because you have long held to yourselves what belonged equally to others, have you obtained a right to keep that hold? The government is it not of the Gentile as well as of the Jew? Yes, of the Gentile also' for rights as well as for duties. Surrender then promptly and cheerfully, and think yourselves fortunate you are not called upon to indemnify. But how many boroughs are there for which large sums have been given? Would you snatch from them what you have allowed to become property? Is it not a maxim of legal and moral equity, that if private rights be sacrificed to public good, indemnity should be made? Would you, for instance, manumit the slave, and not compensate the owner? Certainly not; but to the case before us the maxim will not apply. The laws have sanctioned the rights of the slave-owner; but what law has sanctioned the possessions of the borough-owner? No law contemplates borough-property-no, not even common law, we believe. It is a non-entity in the courts, and could not specifically be sued. Away with the pretended right, then; it has no legal sanction, and its monstrous iniquity forbids us to consider it as an equitable one. But corporations-what of them? They are established by law. Well, law may un-establish them. The privileges of these corporations were never destined for private advantages, but for public good. Prove them destructive of that public good, and you produce reason enough for their abolition. No indemnity, again, can be called for here. Their privileges were made with one breath, and they may be annihilated with another. Be their usefulness what it might originally, what is the good of them now? To protect their own monopoly. No stranger can open a shop without their permission, and the payment of fees. What claim, in reason or common sense, have they to such privileges? What equivalent have they given, or could they give? Why should not every member of the community be permitted to go where he pleases-where he can best earn his liveli. hood? Why is a town, when invested with the right of sending representatives, to have that right intercepted, as in many cases it is, by a score or two of corporators ?-Oh, but how is the police of a town to be managed without a corporation? Nay, how is it actually managed in towns of equal or superior magnitude, without corporate rights? But then the property bequeathed to corporations, what is to become of that? That property has been assigned by the donors to specific purposes; and to those specific purposes it may still be applied, without maintaining the usurping privileges of corporations. But we have really just now no further concern with corporations, than as they interfere with the rights of suffrage, which we insist must be universal, to satisfy the exigencies of social rights.

The variety of qualification is thoroughly ridiculous. If I take a house in Westminster or Southwark, I have a vote, and sometimes the opportunity of employing it. If I reside at Bath, I have none, unless I can squeeze into the corporation-which, of course, is not what every one would like to do; if at Malmesbury, squeezing into the corporation will not do, till seniority brings me up among the seven select; if at Canterbury, I must purchase of the corporation, and they may refuse; if in Manchester, I can get a vote on no terms, for there are no representatives; and I lose my University right, if I do not continue my name on the boards, that is, continue to pay a refreshing fee of three or four pounds every year. If I have a freehold of forty shillings in any county-a copyhold of forty thousand pounds is useless-I havea vote for that county; but I might as well be without it; because, unless there are men to spend forty, fifty, -one hundred thousand pounds, there will be no choice, and where there is a choice, it lies between the sons or protégés of overgrown peers. But if I am the lucky owner of Old Sarum, or CorfeCastle, or any one of fifty other places, I can even seat any body I like, without further trouble; or if I choose to make money of my privilege, I can put it into my attorney's hands, and sell it for five thousand pounds. How such discrepancies arise every body knows, but on what principle is the continuance of them so pertinaciously defended? The terrors of innovation? no; we can innovate fast enough now-a-days, when the Government leads the way. It is simply, because those who have the power, choose to keep it. But that is just so much the more compelling reason for the excluded to club and exert their power, and force the privileged to surrender an equitable participation.

But not only are one-half of the nation excluded from a single vote, but numbers have a plurality. This is as intolerable as the exclusion: it is an insulting mockery of those who have none. The same person may have votes by birth, residence, purchase, and corporate privilege; and one hundred pounds a year will secure forty shilling freeholds in every county in England and Wales, while half a million in the funds or thousands in copy-hold, will not give one. If property is to qualify, multiply votes in proportion to property; but if property does not in numerous instances at all, why should it in any? Universal suffrage, and no ' qualification,' is the only rational course.

The petty plans of our whig reformers fill us with contempt. Let all who pay direct taxes, says Lord John Russel, the oracle of reform, have a vote. Now observe, only five or six millions out of fifty-seven are so raised that is, one out of eleven. We do not say the number of suffrages would be reduced in the same proportion; but we question whether this precious scheme would not disfranchise as many as it would enfranchise. Besides, why such distinction? The indirect is as much a tax as the direct. Some men can make a distinction and forget to ascertain the difference.

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So much for the rights of electors. Let us turn for a moment to the elections. What scenes of riot and confusion ;-would you extend these horrors of turbulence into districts that are at present happily exempt from their periodical visitations? No. We say why congregate a mob at all? Why assemble freemen from every side of the kingdom to the borough, and freeholders to the county-town? Qualify every man in the district in which he resides, and let proper officers take their votes on the spot, parochially and simultaneously, after the manner in which the last population-act was carried into execution. Why cast a needless expense upon the candidate, for carriage, for subsistence, and then talk about bribery? The sums that are spent in direct bribery, except in close boroughs, where five, or twenty, or fifty guineas a head is the current price or three, four, or five thousand to the patron-these sums so spent, we say, are insignificant com