and the acts of our State legislatures, like those of the present legislative councils in the territories, would have been subjected to the revision and control of Congress. If the will of a majority of Congress is to be the supreme law of the land, it is clear the Constitution is a dead letter, and has utterly failed of the very object for which it was designed-the protection of the rights of the minority. But when, by the very terms of the compact, strict limitations are imposed on every branch of the federal government, and it is, moreover, expressly declared, that all powers, not granted to them, "are reserved to the States or the people," with what show of reason can it be contended, that the federal government is to be the exclusive judge of the extent of its own powers? A written Constitution was resorted to in this country, as a great experiment, for the purpose of ascertaining how far the rights of a minority could be secured against the encroachments of majorities often acting under party excitement, and not unfrequently under the influence of strong interests. The moment that Constitution was formed, the will of the majority ceased to be the law, except in cases that should be acknowledged by the parties to it to be within the Constitution, and to have been thereby submitted to their will. But when Congress (exercising a delegated and strictly limited authority) pass beyond these limits, their acts become null and void; and must be declared to be so by the courts, in cases within their jurisdiction; and may be pronounced to be so, by the States themselves, in cases not within the jurisdiction of the courts, of sufficient importance to justify such an inference.

But what then? asks the gentleman. A State is brought into collision with the United States, in relation to the exercise of unconstitutional powers: who is to decide between them? Sir, it is the common case of difference of opinion between sovereigns, as to the true construction of a compact. Does such a difference of opinion necessarily produce war? No. And if not, among rival nations, why should it do so among friendly States? In all such cases, some mode must be devised by mutual agreement, for settling the difficulty: and most happily for us, that mode is clearly indicated in the Constitution itself, and results indeed from the very form and structure of the government. The creating power is three-fourths of the States. By their decision, the parties to the compact have agreed to be bound, even to the extent of changing the entire form of the government itself; and it follows of necessity, that in case of a deliberate and settled difference of opinion between the parties to the compact, as to the extent of the powers of either, resort must be had to their common superior-(that power which may give any character to the Constitution they may think proper)-viz: three-fourths of the

States.

But it has been asked, why not compel a State, objecting to the constitutionality of a law, to appeal to her sister States, by a

proposition to amend the Constitution? I answer, because, such a course would, in the first instance, admit the exercise of an unconstitutional authority, which the States are not bound to submit to, even for a day, and because it would be absurd to suppose that any redress would ever be obtained by such an appeal, even if a State were at liberty to make it. If a majority of both Houses of Congress should, from any motive, be induced deliberately, to exercise "powers not granted," what prospect would there be of "arresting the progress of the evil," by a vote of three-fourths? But the Constitution does not permit a minority to submit to the people a proposition for an amendment of the Constitution. Such a proposition can only come from "twothirds of the two Houses of Congress, or the legislatures of twothirds of the States." It will be seen therefore, at once, that a ninority, whose constitutional rights are violated, can have no redress by an amendment of the Constitution. When any State is brought into direct collision with the federal government, in the case of an attempt, by the latter, to exercise unconstitutional powers, the appeal must be made by Congress, (the party proposing to exert the disputed power,) in order to have it expressly conferred, and, until so conferred, the exercise of such authority must be suspended. Even in cases of doubt, such an appeal is due to the peace and harmony of the government. On this subject our present chief magistrate, in his opening message to Congress, says: "I regard an appeal to the source of power, in cases of real doubt, and where its exercise is deemed indispensable to the general welfare, as among the most sacred of all our obligations. Upon this country, more than any other, has, in the providence of God, been cast the special guardianship of the great principle of adherence to written Constitutions. If it fail here, all hope in regard to it will be extinguished. That this was intended to be a government of limited and specific, and not general powers, must be admitted by all; and it is our duty to preserve for it the character intended by its framers. The scheme has worked well. It has exceeded the hopes of those who devised it, and become an object of admiration to the world. Nothing is clearer, in my view, than that we are chiefly indebted for the success of the Constitution under which we are now acting, to the watchful and auxiliary operation of the State authorities. This is not the reflection of a day, but belongs to the most deeply rooted convictions of my mind, I cannot, therefore, too strongly or too earnestly, for my own sense of its importance, warn you against all encroachments upon the legitimate sphere of State sovereignty. Sustained by its healthful and invigorating influence, the federal system can never fail."

I have already shown, that it has been fully recognized by the Virginia resolutions of '98, and by Mr. Madison's report on these resolutions, that it is not only "the right, but the duty of the States," to "judge of infractions of the Constitution," and "to

and the acts of our State legislatures, like those of the present legislative councils in the territories, would have been subjected to the revision and control of Congress. If the will of a majority of Congress is to be the supreme law of the land, it is clear the Constitution is a dead letter, and has utterly failed of the very object for which it was designed-the protection of the rights of the minority. But when, by the very terms of the compact, strict limitations are imposed on every branch of the federal government, and it is, moreover, expressly declared, that all powers, not granted to them, "are reserved to the States or the people," with what show of reason can it be contended, that the federal government is to be the exclusive judge of the extent of its own powers? A written Constitution was resorted to in this country, as a great experiment, for the purpose of ascertaining how far the rights of a minority could be secured against the encroachments of majorities often acting under party excitement, and not unfrequently under the influence of strong interests. The moment that Constitution was formed, the will of the majority ceased to be the law, except in cases that should be acknowledged by the parties to it to be within the Constitution, and to have been thereby submitted to their will. But when Congress (exercising a delegated and strictly limited authority) pass beyond these limits, their acts become null and void; and must be declared to be so by the courts, in cases within their jurisdiction; and may be pronounced to be so, by the States themselves, in cases not within the jurisdiction of the courts, of sufficient importance to justify such an inference.

But what then? asks the gentleman. A State is brought into collision with the United States, in relation to the exercise of unconstitutional powers: who is to decide between them? Sir, it is the common case of difference of opinion between sovereigns, as to the true construction of a compact. Does such a difference of opinion necessarily produce war? No. And if not, among rival nations, why should it do so among friendly States? In all such cases, some mode must be devised by mutual agreement, for settling the difficulty: and most happily for us, that mode is clearly indicated in the Constitution itself, and results indeed from the very form and structure of the government. The creating power is three-fourths of the States. By their decision, the parties to the compact have agreed to be bound, even to the extent of changing the entire form of the government itself; and it follows of necessity, that in case of a deliberate and settled difference of opinion between the parties to the compact, as to the extent of the powers of either, resort must be had to their common superior-(that power which may give any character to the Constitution they may think proper)-viz: three-fourths of the States.

But it has been asked, why not compel a State, objecting to the constitutionality of a law, to appeal to her sister States, by a

tional compact, must ultimately decide whether it has been violated, that such a decision ought to be interposed, either in a hasty manner, or on doubtful and inferior occasions.

"The resolution has, accordingly, guarded against any misapprehension of its object, by expressly requiring, for such an interposition, 'the case of a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous breach of the Constitution, by the exercise of powers not granted by it.'

"But the resolution has done more than guard against misconstruction, by expressly referring to cases of a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous nature. It specifies the object of the interposition which it contemplates to be solely that of arresting the progress of the evil of usurpation, and of maintaining the authorities, rights, and liberties appertaining to the States, as parties to the Constitution."

No one can read this, without perceiving that Mr. Madison goes the whole length, in support of the principles for which I have been contending.

The gentleman has called upon us to carry out our scheme practically. Now, sir, if I am correct in my view of this matter, then it follows, of course, that the right of a State being established, the federal government is bound to acquiesce in a solemn decision of a State, acting in its sovereign capacity, at least so far as to make an appeal to the people for an amendment of the Constitution. This solemn decision of a State, (made either through its legislature or a Convention, as may be supposed to be the proper organ of its sovereign will a point I do not propose now to discuss,) binds the federal government under the highest constitutional obligation, not to resort to any means of coercion against the citizens of the dissenting State. How then can any collision ensue between the federal and State governments, unless, indeed, the former should determine to enforce the law by unconstitutional means?

Sir, I will put the case home to the gentleman. Is there any violation of the constitutional rights of the States, and the liberties of the citizens, (sanctioned by Congress and the Supreme Court,) which he would believe it to be the right and duty of a State to resist? Does he contend for the doctrine "of passive obedience and non-resistance? Would he justify an open resistance to an Act of Congress sanctioned by the Courts, which should abolish the trial by jury, or destroy the freedom of religion, or the freedom of the press? Yes, sir, he would advocate resistance in such cases; and so would I, and so would all of

But such resistance would, according to his doctrine, be revolution: it would be rebellion. According to my opinion it would be just, legal, and constitutional resistance. The whole difference between us, then, consists in this: the gentleman would make force the only arbiter in all cases of collision between the States and the federal government. I would resort to ■ peaceful remedy-the interposition of the State to "arrest the

and the acts of our State legislatures, like those of the present legislative councils in the territories, would have been subjected to the revision and control of Congress. If the will of a majority of Congress is to be the supreme law of the land, it is clear the Constitution is a dead letter, and has utterly failed of the very object for which it was designed-the protection of the rights of the minority. But when, by the very terms of the compact, strict limitations are imposed on every branch of the federal government, and it is, moreover, expressly declared, that all powers, not granted to them, "are reserved to the States or the people," with what show of reason can it be contended, that the federal government is to be the exclusive judge of the extent of its own powers? A written Constitution was resorted to in this country, as a great experiment, for the purpose of ascertaining how far the rights of a minority could be secured against the encroachments of majorities often acting under party excitement, and not unfrequently under the influence of strong interests. The moment that Constitution was formed, the will of the majority ceased to be the law, except in cases that should be acknowledged by the parties to it to be within the Constitution, and to have been thereby submitted to their will. But when Congress (exercising a delegated and strictly limited authority) pass beyond these limits, their acts become null and void; and must be declared to be so by the courts, in cases within their jurisdiction; and may be pronounced to be so, by the States themselves, in cases not within the jurisdiction of the courts, of sufficient importance to justify such an inference.

But what then? asks the gentleman. A State is brought into collision with the United States, in relation to the exercise of unconstitutional powers: who is to decide between them? Sir, it is the common case of difference of opinion between sovereigns, as to the true construction of a compact. Does such a difference of opinion necessarily produce war? No. And if not, among rival nations, why should it do so among friendly States? In all such cases, some mode must be devised by mutual agreement, for settling the difficulty: and most happily for us, that mode is clearly indicated in the Constitution itself, and results indeed from the very form and structure of the government. The creating power is three-fourths of the States. By their decision, the parties to the compact have agreed to be bound, even to the extent of changing the entire form of the government itself; and it follows of necessity, that in case of a deliberate and settled difference of opinion between the parties to the compact, as to the extent of the powers of either, resort must be had to their common superior-(that power which may give any character to the Constitution they may think proper)-viz: three-fourths of the

States.

But it has been asked, why not compel a State, objecting to the constitutionality of a law, to appeal to her sister States, by a