rooted out, which tie down, and cramp the understanding, not suffering us to exert the whole man.

We are usually told, how the Gods are to be worshipped: we are forbid to light our lamps on the Sabbath-day (q), because the Gods want no light, nor are men themselves delighted with smoke. Let us likewife forbid the morning falutations (r), and fitting at the Temple (before the doors are opened) to receive ceremonial compliments. These are vain allurements, that please human ambition. He who knows God, ferveth and honoureth him. Let us forbid the bringing linnen, and flesh-brushes and combs to Jupiter, or the holding out a mirror to Juno (s). God wants not fuch fervices, nor requires at his altars fuch idle minifters. For why? He himself miniftreth to man; he is every where present and eafy of accefs to all (t); a man may be taught how to behave himself at facrifices and in public worship, without any curious and troublesome fuperftition; but he will never be perfect in religious duty, 'till he hath conceived in his mind a right notion of God; as the poffeffor, and giver, of all things, and who freely and graciously bestows ineftimable benefits upon us (u). And from whence arifeth this affection for man? What induceth the Almighty thus to pour his benefits upon us? Nature, (or his own goodnefs.) The man is mistaken who thinks the Gods afflict any one willingly (x). They cannot; they neither can do, nor receive an injury. (For there is a connection between doing and fuffering harm.) That fupreme and moft excellent Nature which hath exempted them fron danger, hath likewife rendered them not dangerous to their creature,

man.

Now the first step to the right worshipping of God, is, to believe there is a God (y). And next, to afcribe unto him all Majefty and all Goodness (2), without which true Majefty cannot fubfift; to know likewife, that it is he who governs the world, and prefides over the universe as his own, who hath taken mankind in general under his protection; and on fome is pleafed to bestow particular favour (aa). He can neither do, nor fuffer evil. God however is fometimes pleased to

chaftife, and lay heavy penalties upon fome perfons under the appearance of fome good (bb). But would you be happy in his favour? be a good man (cc). To be a good man, and to honour God as you ought, is to endeavour as much as poflible to imitate him in all things.

Another question is, how we must behave ourselves towards man ? And how do we behave? What precepts do we give in this refpect? To abstain from fhedding human blood? But what a small thing is it not to hurt him, to whom we ought to do all the good that lies in our power? It is indeed praise-worthy for men to be kindly affectioned, one towards another (dd). Shall we then direct a man to reach out his hand to the fhipwreck'd; to fhew the wandering traveller his way; and to divide our bread with the hungry (ce)? Yes, certainly. But every thing that he ought to do, or avoid doing, may be comprehended in a few words; when, to follow Nature, may be looked upon as a complete direction and rule of human duty: all that you fee, (the heavens and the earth wherein are contained all things, both human and divine) is We are members of this great body (ff): we are all akin by Nature, who hath formed us of the fame elements, and placed us here together for the fame end: fhe hath implanted in us mutual affection, and made us fociable (gg); fhe hath commanded justice and equity; by her appointment it is more wretched to do an injury than to fuffer one (bb); and by her command the hand is ever ready to aflift our brother. That excellent verfe (of Terence) fhould ever be in our breast and in our mouth;

one.

Homo fum, humani nihil a me alienum puto (i):

I am a man, and, as fuch, concern'd

In every bufinefs that relates to man.

We must confider that we are born, for the good of the whole: human fociety resembles a vaulted roof of stone, which would foon fall, unless prevented by one stone fupporting another (kk).

Having thus confidered our duty with regard both to God and man, let us fee how we are to act with regard to things. Precepts would be entirely fuperfluous, unless it were premised what opinion we ought to

have of every thing, as of poverty, riches, glory, ignominy, our own country, and banishment. We must weigh each particular severally, without any regard to common report, and duly examine what they really are, and not what they are called.

To pafs on to the confideration of virtues. Some one perhaps will direct us, highly to eftcem Providence; cordially to embrace friendship; to love temperance, and that, if poffible, we should more strictly adhere to justice than to any of the rest. But all this would be to little purpose, if we knew not what virtue is; whether there be one or more; whether they are feparable, or indiffolubly connected together (1); whether he that hath one virtue, hath all the reft, or what is the difference between them. There is no need for a fmith to be inquifitive after the origin of his art, or of what ufe it is, any more than for a player of pantomimes to make the like enquiries concerning the art of dancing. Such occupations are fully comprehended in the knowledge of the art itself; they need nothing more, for they appertain not to the whole of life. But virtue is the knowledge of other things as well as of herself: we must learn from her what the will is, or ought to be. An action can never be fit and right where the will is not fo; for on the will depends the action.

Again, the will can never be right, unless the habit or difpofition of the mind be fo; for from this proceeds the will; the difpofition of the mind cannot be in its best state unless it perceives the whole duty of life, knows how to judge of things, and can reduce them all to truth. None but such as have a steady and immutable judgment can enjoy true tranquillity: other men fall now and then, and again recover themfelves; and are continually fluctuating between defire and averfion. Now the reafon of this is, that, being led by common report, that moft uncertain guide, they are confident in nothing. Would you always will the fame thing? you must always will that which is right and according to the truth of things (mm.) But no one can come at truth without certain maxims and decrees which comprehend the whole of life.

Good

Good and evil, honourable and bafe, juft and unjuft, pious and impious, all virtues and their uses, the poffeffion of all conveniencies (~~), efteem, dignity, health, ftrength, beauty, fagacity, and wit, all these things require fuch a one as can truly judge of them, and rate them according to their merit, or demerit. For you are often mistaken, and eftimate things at more than their real value; nay, you are fo far deceived that thofe things, which are generally efteemed at the highest rate, as riches, favour, power, are intrinfically of little or no worth at all. Now this you cannot know unless you infpect the nature of things, and obferve the decree itself, whereby all things are comparatively valuable as the leaves of trees cannot live of themselves, but require a branch whereon to ftick, and receive therefrom their proper fap and nutriment; fo precepts while fingle, wither away and die; they require to be fixed and fupported by the mother-root (0).

Befides, they who would difcard decrees, feem not to know, that they confirm them by the very reasons they give for discarding them. For they say, that life being fufficiently difplayed and tutored by precepts, the decrees or maxims of wisdom are therefore fuperfluous: but even this affertion is itself a decree; juft as were I to fay, that we ought to give over precepts, and apply ourselves only to decrees; in the very article by which I deny the ufe of precepts, I fhould offer a precept myself.

ap

There are fome things which require only the fimple admonition of philofophy; other things require proof; and there are some so very intricate and confufed, that with the greatest fubtilty, diligence and plication, a man can fcarce come at the true fenfe and meaning of them. If proofs then are neceffary, fo are decrees, which are founded upon truth collected from arguments. Some things are clear and manifeft; other things dark and obscure; the former are fuch as are comprehended by the senses and memory; the latter such as lie beyond their reach: but reason is not fatisfied with the things that are manifeft; the greater and more beautiful part thereof is employed on things that are hidden now hidden things require proof, and proof cannot be without decrees; decrees therefore are neceffary.

Again, the perfuafion or apprehenfion of certain things, without which perfuafion the mind would be ever wavering and unsteady, is what forms common fenf, and perfects the fame. Decrees are therefore neceffary; inasmuch as they endow the mind with a steady, and inflexible judgment. Laftly, when we exhort a man to hold his friend as dear to him as his ownfelf; and to think that it is poffible to make a friend of an enemy (pp); that he may encreafe the affections of the former, and moderate the averfion of the latter, we add 'hereunto, that this is juft, and fit, and honourable. But in the reafon of our decrees are this juftice and honesty comprifed; therefore is reafon neceffary, and confequently

the decrees.

But let us join both precepts and decrees together; for without the root the branches are fruitlefs; and even the roots are aided and affifted by the branches they themselves produced. No one can be ignorant of the usefulness of the hands; they do their work openly; but the heart, whereby they live, from whence they receive both power and motion, lies hidden in fecret: I may fay the fame of precepts, they are open, and plain to view; but the decrees of wifdom are hidden. As in facreds none know the mysterious parts but fuch as have been initiated; fo in philofophy, her myfteries are unfolded to none but to fuch as are admitted into her fanctuary (99).

But precepts, and the like, are alfo known to the vulgar and profane. Pofidonius not only judgeth preception (for I know not why I should not ufe the word) but alfo perfilion, confolation, and exhortation neceffary. To these he adds an erjairy into caufes, which I fee not why I may not call (ætiologiam), atiology, fince the Grammarians, the professed guardians of the Latin tongue, make ufe of it in their own right. Pofidonius, I fay, affirms that profit may be received from the defcription of every virtue, and this he calls etiology; others call it, characteristics, that give the figns or marks of every vice and virtue, whereby fuch things as feem alike are diftinguishable.

VOL. II.

B b

This.