every thing. Good can by no means be affigned to brute animals; it is of a more noble and happy nature. There can be no good, but where there is reafon. There are four feveral natures: that of a tree, that of a beaft, that of a man, and that of God. The former two, being both irrational, have much the fame nature. The other two have different natures, the one being immortal, the other mortal. The nature then of one, i. e. of God, is perfect good in itself; and care and diligence in the other, i. e. in man, hath made alfo his (refpectively) perfect. Other things are faid to be perfect in their nature, but not truly perfect, forafmuch as they want reafon. For that, in short, is perfect, which is perfect according to univerfal nature; but univerfal nature is rational; other things however may be perfect in their kind. In what there cannot be a blessed life, neither can be that by which a bleffed life is effected; there is not in a brute animal that whereby a bleffed life is effected, therefore in a brute animal good is not. A brute animal indeed comprehends things prefent by fenfation; and remembers things past, when the fenfe is awakened thereto by fomething prefent. As a horse remembers the road when he is put into it; but it is not to be supposed that in the stable he remembers any thing of the road, though he treads it every day (a). The third degree of time, I mean the time to come, appertaineth not to brute beafts. How then can the nature of those things seem perfect, which have not the use of perfect time? For time is divided into three parts, paft, prefent, and future that only which is fhorteft, and is paffing, i. e. the present, is given to the knowledge of animals; very rare is the remembrance of the past, nor ever recovered, but by the intervention of fomething prefent. The good therefore of a perfect nature cannot be in a nature that is imperfect; or if it naturally hath good, it is of the same fort that plants also have. Nor do I deny but that brute animals are carried with a strong force and impulfe towards thofe things that feem agreeable to nature; but then ЁСА. 367 then it is in a confused and disorderly manner; but there can never be any diforder or confufion in good. Why then, fay you, are brute animals moved confufedly and diforderly? I said this upon a fuppofition, that their nature was capable of order; they are now moved according to nature. For that is confufed, which may not be fo at another time; and that not at ease, which at another time may be fecure. Vice is in none, but where alfo there may be virtue. The motion then in brute beafts is fuch as is according to their nature. But not to detain you too long, fuppofe a brute animal to have fome good, fome virtue, fomething perfect; what then? It is not abfolutely good, nor virtue nor perfection; for these privileges belong only to rational animals, to whom it is given to know, wherefore, how far, and in what manner. So that good is in nothing but where there is reason. You ask, whereunto tends this difcourfe, and wherein will it profit the mind? I will tell you; it both exercises and sharpens it: and, as the mind must be employed fome way or other (b), detains it in a fit employ it is of fervice likewise in preventing it from pursuing its natural tendency to ill. But give me leave further to say, that I cannot poffibly confer a greater benefit upon you, than by pointing out to you your own good, by distinguishing you from brute beasts, and placing you in communion with God. Why then, I fay, do you take fo much pains in nourishing and exercifing the ftrength of your body; as if this was to be boafted of? Nature hath given this in greater perfection to savage beasts. Why fo careful to heighten and preserve beauty? When you have done all you can, many animals will excell you herein. Why do you trim your hair with so great diligence and art? Whether you let it flow at full length, like the Parthians, or tie it up in a knot like the Germans, or frizzle and spread it wide, like the Scythians; every horse shall tofs about a thicker and more flowing mane; and the lion fhall look more formidably noble: and whatever swiftness you pretend to, you are no match for the little hare. Would Would you then laying afide these qualifications, in which you are neceffarily excelled, as they are foreign to you, return to your own proper good? Know, it is this: a mind or foul truly reformed, and comparatively pure as God is pure: advancing itself above all earthly things, and reckoning nothing its own from without. Thou art a rational animal; and what is the good within thee? Perfect reason. Do all you can then to advance this, and carry it to the highest perfection, its proper end. Then think yourself happy, when all joy and Latisfaction arise from yourself; when in all those things that men so greedily catch at, fo fondly wish for, and fo carefully guard, you can find nothing, which, I do not fay, you had rather have, but which you at all defire. I will conclude with this short rule, whereby you may examine yourself, and know whether you are as yet perfect. Thou shalt poffefs the proper good, when thou shalt know and understand, infeliciffimos effe felices, that they are most unhappy, who are happy (c). (a) If brutes have any ideas at all, and are not bare machines (as fome would have them) we cannot deny them to have some reason. It seems as evident to me that they do fome of them in certain instances reason, as that they have fenfe; but it is only in particular ideas, just as they received them from their fenfes. Locke, p. 121. There is a gradation or scale of afcent of the principle of action among creatures in proportion to their perfection, with regard to the motion of their bodies.. But men have further a power of directing arbitrarily their perceptive capacity to, and throughout their paft perceptions, which brutes have not: and therefore cannot properly be called thinking creatures. And this is the specific difference betwixt rational and irrational beings, as this power is the foundation of the rational See Baxter on Locke, p. 79, &c. Brown on the understanding, p. 173. (6) That there are ideas, fome or other always prefent in the mind of a waking man, every one's experience convinces him: though the mind employs itself about them with feveral degrees of attention, &c. Locke, p. 184. (c) Or it may be, rendered, that the most unhappy are happy, if they discharge to the best of their power the refpective duties of life. A-B THE END. |