now under discussion. They are, his speech of the 15th September, his published letter of the 3d November, and his leading speech at the present session. These productions are all marked with his characteristic ability; they are ingenious, able, condensed, and striking. They deserve an answer. To some of the observations in the speech of September, I made a reply on the day of its delivery; there are other parts of it, however, which require a more deliberate examination.

Mr. President, the honorable gentleman declares in that speech, "that he belongs to the State Rights party; that that party, from the beginning of the Government, has been opposed to a national bank as unconstitutional, inexpedient, and dangerous; that it has ever dreaded the union of the political and moneyed power, and the central action of the Government, to which it so strongly tends; that the connexion of the Government with the banks, whether it be with a combination of State banks, or with a national institution, will necessarily centralize the action of the system at the principal point of collection and disbursement, and at which the mother bank, or the head of the league of State banks, must be located. From that point, the whole system, through the connexion with the Government, will be enabled to control the exchanges both at home and abroad, and, with it, the commerce, foreign and domestic, including exports and imports."

Now, sir, this connexion between Government and the banks, to which he imputes such mischievous consequences, he describes to be "the receiving and paying away their notes as cash; and the use of the public money, from the time of the collection to the disbursement."

Sir, if I clearly comprehend the honorable gentleman, he means no more, after all, than this: that, while the public revenues are collected, as heretofore, through the banks, they will lie in the banks between the time of collection and the time of disbursement; that, during that period, they will be regarded as one part of the means of business and of discount possessed by the banks; and that, as a greater portion of the revenue is collected in large cities than in small ones, these large cities will, of course, derive greater benefit than the small ones from these deposites in the banks. In other words, that, as the importing merchants in a great city pay more duties to Government than those in a small one, so they enjoy an advantage to be derived from any use which the banks may make of these moneys, while on deposite with them. Now, sir, I would be very glad to know, supposing all this to be true, what there is in it either unequal or unjust ? The benefit is exactly in proportion to the amount of business, and to the sums paid. If individuals in large cities enjoy the incidental use of more money, it is simply because they pay more money. It is like the case of credit on duty bonds. Whoever imports goods with the benefit of giving bond for duties, instead of making present payment, enjoys a certain benefit; and this benefit, in a direct sense, is in proportion to the amount of goods imported-the large

importer having credit for a large sum, the small importer having credit for a smaller sum. But the advantage, the benefit, or the indulgence, or whatever we call it, is, nevertheless, entirely equal and impartial.

How, then, does the collection of revenue through the banks "centralize" the action of the commercial system? It seems to me, sir, the cause is mistaken for the effect. The greatest amount of revenue is collected in the greatest city, because it is already the greatest city; because its local advantages, its population, its capital and enterprise, draw business towards it, constitute it a central point in commercial operations, and have made it the greatest city. It is the centralization of commerce by these just and proper causescauses which must always exist in every country which produce a large collection of revenue in the favored spot. The amount of capital is one very important cause, no doubt; and leaving public moneys in the banks till wanted, allows to merchants, in places of large import, a degree of incidental benefit, in just proportion to the amount of capital by them employed in trade, and no more.

I suppose, sir, it is the natural course of things in every commercial country, that some place, or a few places, should go ahead of others in commercial business importance. This must ever be so, until all places possess precisely equal natural advantages. And I suppose, too, that, instead of being mischievous, it is rather for the common good of all, that there should be some commercial emporium, some central point, for the exchanges of trade. Government, certainly, should not seek to produce this result by the bestowal of unequal privileges; but surely, sir, it would be a very strange and indefensible policy which should lead the Government to withhold any portion of the capital of the country from useful employment, merely because that, if employed, while all enjoyed the benefit proportionately, all would not enjoy it with the same absolute mathematical equality.

So much, sir, for concentration, arising from depositing the revenues in banks. Let us now look to the other part of the connexion, viz : the receiving of bank notes for duties. How in the world does this "centralize" the commercial system? The whole tendency and effect, as it seems to me, is directly the other way. It counteracts centralization. It gives all possible advantage to local currency and local payments, and thereby encourages both imports and exports. It tends to make local money good everywhere. If goods be imported into Charleston, the duties are paid in Charleston notes. New York notes are not demanded. Nothing, certainly, can be fairer or more equal than this, and nothing more favorable to the Charleston importers.

But how would that system work, which the gentleman himself proposes?

If his plan could prevail, he would have the duties collected either in specie, or in a Government paper to be issued from the Treasury. He would reject all bank notes whatever. If the gentleman, sir, fears centralization, I am astonished that he does not see cen

tralization in all its terrors in this very proposition of his own. Pray allow me to ask, sir, where will this Government paper, in the course of its issue and circulation, naturally centre? To what points will it tend? Certainly, most certainly, to the greatest points of collection and expenditure; to the very heart of the metropolitan city, wherever that city may be. This is as inevitable as the fall of water or the results of attraction. If two-thirds of the duties be collected in New York, it will follow, of course, that two-thirds of any Government paper received for duties will be there received; and it will be more valuable there than elsewhere. The value of such paper would consist in its receivability, and nothing else. It would always tend, therefore, directly to the spot where the greatest demand should exist for it for that purpose. Is it not so at this moment with the outstanding Treasury notes? Are they abundant in Georgia, in Mississippi in Illinois, or in New Hampshire? No sooner issued, than they commence their march toward the place where they are most valued and most in demand: that is, to the place of the greatest public receipt. If you want concentration, sir, and enough of it-if you desire to dry up the small streams of commerce, and fill more full the deep and already swollen great channels, you will act very wisely to that end, if you keep out of the receipt of the Treasury all money but such paper as the Government may furnish, and which shall be no otherwise redeemable than in receipt for debts to Government while at the same time you depress the character of the local circulation.

Such is the scheme of the honorable member in its probable commercial effect. Let us look at it in a political point of view.

The honorable member says he belongs to the State-rights party; that party professes something of an uncommon love of liberty; an extraordinary sensibility to all its dangers; and of those dangers, it most dreads the union of the political and money power. This we learn from the authentic declaration of the gentleman himself. And now, oh, transcendental consistency! oh, most wonderful conformity of means and ends! oh, exquisite mode of gratifying high desires! behold, the honorable member proposes that the political power of the State shall take to itself the whole function of supplying the entire paper circulation of the country, by notes or bills of its own, issued at its own discretion, to be paid out or advanced to whomsoever it pleases, in discharging the obligations of Government, bearing no promise to pay, and to be kept in circulation merely by being made receivable at the Treasury! The whole circulation of the country, excepting only that which is metallic, and which must always be small, will thus be made up of mere Government paper, issued for Government purposes, and redeemable only in payment of Government debts. In other words, the entire means of carrying on the whole commerce of the country will be held by Government in its own hands, and made commensurate, exactly, with its own wants, purposes, and opinions; the whole commercial business of the country being thus made a mere appendage to revenue.

But, sir, in order that I may not misrepresent the honorable member, let me show you a little more distinctly what his opinions are respecting this Government paper.

The honorable member says, sir, that to make this sub-treasury measure successful, and to secure it against reaction, some safe and stable medium of circulation, "to take the place of bank notes in the fiscal operations of the Government, ought to be issued;" that, "in the present condition of the world, a paper currency, in some form, if not necessary, is almost indispensable, in financial and commercial operations of civilized and extensive communities;" that "the great desideratum is to ascertain what description of paper has the requisite qualities of being free from fluctuation in value, and liability to abuse in the greatest perfection;" that bank notes do not possess these requisites in a degree sufficiently high for this purpose." And then he says, "I go farther. It appears to me, after bestowing the best reflection I can give the subject, that no convertible paper, that is, no paper whose credit rests upon a promise to pay, is suitable for currency." "On what, then, (he asks,) ought a paper currency to rest?" "I would say," he answers, "on demand and supply simply: which regulate the value of every thing else-the constant demand which Government has for its necessary supplies." He then proceeds to observe, "that there might be a sound and safe paper currency, founded on the credit of Government exclusively." "That such paper, only to be issued to those who had claims on the Government, would, in its habitual state, be at or above par with gold and silver;" that "nothing but experience can determine what amount, and of what denominations, might be safely issued; but that it might be safely assumed that the country would absorb an amount greatly exceeding its annual income. Much of its exchanges, which amount to a vast sum, as well as its banking business, would revolve about it; and many millions would thus be kept in circulation beyond the demands of the Government.'

By this scheme, sir, Government, in its disbursements, is not to pay money, but to issue paper. This paper is no otherwise payable or redeemable, than as it may be received at the Treasury. It is expected to be let out much faster than it comes in, so that many millions will be kept in circulation; and its habitual character will be at or above par with gold and silver! Now, sir, if there is to be found anywhere a more plain and obvious project of paper money, in all its deformity, I should not know where to look for it.

In the first place, sir, I have suggested the complete union which it would form, if it were, in itself, practicable, between the political and the money power.

The whole commerce of the country, indeed, under such a state of law, would be little more than a sort of incident to Treasury operations rather a collateral emanation of the revenue system, than a substantial and important branch of the public interest. I have referred also, to its probable consequences, upon that which the gentle

man regards as so great an evil, and which he denominates "the centralization of commercial action."

And now I pray you to consider, Mr. President, in the next place, what an admirable contrivance this would be to secure that economy in the expenses of Government which the gentleman has so much at heart. Released from all necessity of taxation, and from the consequent responsibility to the people; not called upon to regard at all, the amount of annual income; having an authority to cause Treasury notes to issue whenever it pleases,

"In multitudes, like which the populous North
Poured never from her frozen loins, to pass
Rhene, or the Danau ;"

what admirable restraint would be imposed on Government, how doubly sure would assurance be made for it, that all its expenditures would be strictly limited to the absolute and indispensable wants and demands of the public service!

But, sir, fortunately, very fortunately, a scheme so wild, and which would be so mischievous, is totally impracticable. It rests on an assumption, for which there is not the least foundation, either in reason or experience. It takes for granted that which the history of every commercial state refutes, and our own, especially, in almost every page. It supposes that irredeemable Government paper can circulate in the business of society, and be kept at par. This is an impossibility. The honorable gentleman rejects convertible bank notes, which are equivalent to specie, since they will always command it, and adopts, in their stead, Government paper, with no promise to pay, but a promise only to be received for debts and taxes; and he puts forth the imagination, as I have said, so often and so long refuted, that this paper will be kept in circulation in the country, and will be able to perform the great business of currency and exchange, even though it exist in quantities exceeding, by many millions, the demands of Government.

If it be necessary, sir, at this day, to refute ideas like these, it must be because the history of all countries, our own included, is a dead letter to us. Even at the very moment in which I am speaking, the small amount of Treasury notes which has been issued by Government, hardly a fifth part of the ordinary annual revenue-though those notes bear an interest of five per cent— though they are redeemable in cash at the Treasury, at the expiration of the year-and though, in the mean time, they are everywhere received in Government dues, are not only of less value than specie, but of less value, also, than the notes of non-specie-paying banks; those banks whose paper is daily denounced here as "rags, filthy rags." In my opinion, sir, the whole scheme is as visionary and impracticable as any which the genius of project ever produced.

Mr. President, toward the close of this speech of September, I find a paragraph in which several other subjects are brought together, and which I must ask permission to read.